
MasterChef: "Top 15 Compete/Top 14 Compete"
Last week, I wrote something to the effect that anyone who styles himself as a libertarian would have been unable to support the civil rights movement and forced desegregation. Writing about gay marriage at National Review, George Weigel agrees with me, kind of. Noting that there are people who support the right of gays to marry because they see it as the position that best promotes individual freedom, Weigel argues that “'Gay marriage' in fact represents a vast expansion of state power: In this instance, the state of New York is declaring that it has the competence to redefine a basic human institution in order to satisfy the demands of an interest group looking for the kind of social acceptance that putatively comes from legal recognition... On what principled ground is the New York state legislature, or any other state legislature, going to say 'No' to that, once it has declared that Adam and Steve, or Eve and Evelyn, can in fact get married according to the laws of the state There is a curious rhetorical fact that has usually gone unremarked in these debates, but which is worth pointing out. That what the New York state legislature approved has to be described, not as marriage, but as 'gay marriage; or 'same-sex marriage' is itself a verbal indicator that what is being done here is counterintuitive. We all know, or thought we knew, what marriage is, and to add the qualifier 'gay' or 'same-sex' is a tacit admission by the proponents of the practice that it requires an appeal to authority to enforce what seems strange, odd, not right. The verbal tic of 'gay marriage' or 'same-sex' marriage is thus itself a rhetorical warning sign that what was done in Albany was an exercise in raw state power, the state’s asserting that it can do X simply because it claims that it has the power to do so. And that is an exercise of power that libertarians ought, in theory, to resist, not support."
We're faced then with two intriguing mysteries. Why did the Nozick of 1975 confuse capital with human capital? And why did Nozick by 1989 feel the need to disavow the Nozick of 1975? The key, I think, is recognizing the two mysteries as twin expressions of a single, primal, human fallibility: the need to attribute success to one's own moral substance, failure to sheer misfortune. The effectiveness of the Wilt Chamberlain example, after all, is best measured by how readily you identify with Wilt Chamberlain. Anarchy is nothing if not a tour-de-force, an advertisement not just for libertarianism but for the sinuous intelligence required to put over so peculiar a thought experiment. In the early '70s, Nozick—and this is audible in the writing—clearly identified with Wilt: He believed his talents could only be flattered by a free market in high value-add labor. By the late '80s, in a world gone gaga for Gordon Gekko and Esprit, he was no longer quite so sure.
Even in 1975, it took a pretty narrow view of history to think all capital is human capital, and that philosophy professors, even the especially bright ones, would thrive in the free market. But there was a historical reason for Nozick's belief: the magnificent sieve. Harvard's enrollment prior to World War II was 3,300; after the war, it was 5,300, 4,000 of whom were veterans. The GI Bill was on its way to investing more in education grants, business loans, and home loans than all previous New Deal programs combined. By 1954, with the Cold War in full swing, the U.S. government was spending 20 times what it had spent on research before the war. "Some universities," C. Wright Mills could write in the mid-'50s, "are financial branches of the military establishment." In the postwar decades, the American university grew in enrollment, budget and prestige, thanks to a substantial transfer of wealth from the private economy, under the rubric of "military Keynesianism." As a tentacle of the military-industrial octopus, academia finally lost its last remnant of colonial gentility.
At the same time the university boomed, marginal tax rates for high earners stood as high as 90 percent. This collapsed the so-called L-curve, the graphic depiction of wealth distribution in the United States. The L-curve lay at its flattest in 1970, just as Nozick was sitting down to write Anarchy. In 1970, there were nearly 500,000 employed academics, and their relative income stood at an all-time high. To the extent anyone could believe mental talent, human capital, and capital were indistinguishable, it was thanks to the greatest market distortion in the history of industrial capitalism; and because for 40 years, thanks to this distortion, talent had not been forced to compete with the old "captains of industry" with the financiers and the CEOs.
Buccaneering entrepreneurs, boom-and-bust markets, risk capital—these conveniently disappeared from Nozick's argument because they'd all but disappeared from capitalism. In a world in which J.P. Morgan and Cornelius Vanderbilt have been rendered obsolete, reduced to historical curios, to a funny old-style man, imprisoned in gilt frames, the professionals—the scientists, engineers, professors, lawyers and doctors—correspondingly rise in both power and esteem. And in a world in which the professions are gatekept by universities, which in turn select students based on their measured intelligence, the idea that talent is mental talent, and mental talent is, not only capital, but the only capital, becomes easier and easier for a humanities professor to put across. Hence the terminal irony of Anarchy: Its author's audible smugness in favor of libertarianism was underwritten by a most un-libertarian arrangement—i.e., the postwar social compact of high marginal taxation and massive transfers of private wealth in the name of the very "public good" Nozick decried as nonexistent.
And the screw takes one last turn: By allowing for the enormous rise in (relative) income and prestige of the upper white collar professions, Keynesianism created the very blind spot by which professionals turned against Keynesianism. Charging high fees as defended by their cartels, cartels defended in turn by universities, universities in turn made powerful by the military state, many upper-white-collar professionals convinced themselves their pre-eminence was not an accident of history or the product of negotiated protections from the marketplace but the result of their own unique mental talents fetching high prices in a free market for labor. Just this cocktail of vanity and delusion helped Nozick edge out Rawls in the marketplace of ideas, making Anarchy a surprise best-seller, it helped make Ronald Reagan president five years later. So it was the public good that killed off the public good.

The clear loser of the Republican debate was Tim Pawlenty, who in one bizarre exchange dug in his heels and resolutely refused to humor the moderator's urging him to use the term "Obamaneycare", which he seemed to have coined in an interview last week in order to tar President Obama and Mitt Romney with the same anti-health care brush, and which many observers assumed was meant to be his new campaign mantra, what "Ideas!" is to Newt Gingrich and "9/11!" is to Giuliani. In some societies, Pawlenty's reluctance to play this game would be taken as a heartening sign of dignity and self-respect, but in ours, it was widely seen as horrifying evidence that Pawlenty is already dreaming of being Mitt's vice-presidential candidate someday, and doesn't want to have to try and explain what he'd meant a few months earlier, the way George Bush the Elder was once obliged to insist that he had never met that mysterious man who looked just like him who was in all that news footage condemning "voodoo economics." The sad fact remains that wanting to be vice-president under Mitt Romney is sort of like dreaming of being an actor in the hope that someday, you might get to be Scott Baio's understudy. It does not make you seem like a world beater and future leader of men.
Michele Bachmann declared her candidacy for the Republican presidential nomination during Monday night's debate between Republican presidential candidates, which does go a long way towards explaining what she was doing there. (Depending on who you ask, it was either the first such debate that mattered or the second one following the special debate of marginal wackos.) Bachmann was the unquestioned victor in that debate in the category of exceeding low expectations. Because reporters so enjoy lazily settling into a lazy groove of repeating the same cookie-cutter images they've collectively formed of politicians but at the same time hate themselves for it, a pol who seems to break out of his or her plaster image by seeming just a little bit or less crazy than their regular doppelganger on Saturday Night Live can get a lot out of it. The White House press corps waited for four years for Dan Quayle to exceed expectations so they could proclaim his presidential, and even alerted him to the occasions when they'd be watching in hopes that he'd do it, but Dan is a pure formalist who sticks to the script, his career arc be damned. Bachmann may not have needed to do much to exceed expectations, maybe less than Dan would have. People are celebrating the new, improved Bachmann because she didn't stare into the middle distance at nothing (something she did in her special "Tea Party" response to the President's State of the Union address, because, to demonstrate her political purity, she was looking not into the camera that would carry her image to the news channels but into a special "Tea Party" camera meant to capture the YouTube clip.) Nor did she attempt to stare down viewers as if she were Hyno Toad or flap her bat wings while shrieking that the President is a Muslim terrorist whose green card has expired. She looked well-preserved and acted personable. For this, some have gone so far as to claim that she "won" the debate, mainly because somebody has to have won the debate and a lot of people would rather eat the still-beating hearts of their grandchildren than allow the possibility that it was Romney.
DAYDREAM NATION: I've written before that I have a long-standing problem with the word "smug". I can't always tell what the people who throw it around mean, and I sometimes get the feeling that all they mean is that they're offended that someone who for some reason rubs them the wrong way, or who believes something true that they wish wasn't true, doesn't have the grace to pretend to think they're full of shit. But this thing here... this is the smuggest movie I've ever seen. It belongs to an especially, inherently smug genre, the acrid, cutting-edge satirical vision in high school teen pic drag. (Previous examples: Heathers, Jawbreaker, Pretty Persuasion. The friendlier, not-so-acrid Easy A could eat them all for breakfast.) This one was written and overdirected by a fellow named Michael Goldbach, who wants everyone to know that Sonic Youth mean the world to him, and stars a hideously glammed-up, malfunctioning robot version of the wonderful Kat Dennings. She gets to deliver voiceover narration in her sarcasm-dripping, luded-out voice, letting us know which characters will die of cancer after the movie ends and tipping us off to the presence of a serial killer on the edge of the action, lest we forget that the specter of death hovers over all the high jinks that she reacts to with her suffocating attitude. New in town, she fails to connect with her dumb-as-a-post stoner boyfriend when she tells him that the area "has more incest than an Atom Egoyan movie", and he doesn't get it. That's okay, because the whole point of the line, and the whole point of more like it to come, is to show that the listener doesn't get it, because nobody is as cool as our heroine, her creator, and us lucky ducks who are assumed to appreciate her. It's kind of a drag that there have to be any people in a movie at all, but you can't just film yourself facing the camera and saying, "I guess I'm kinda awesome. Maybe you can be awesome too, if you like what I'm shoveling." That wouldn't leave you much to build the trailer out of.
I liked Sofia Coppola's Lost in Translation back in 2003. I wonder if I would have liked it as much if I'd known that Coppola was going to remake it so soon, without Bill Murray. Somewhere stars Stephen Dorff as a movie star whose life, from what we see of it, consists of all the least interesting parts of a being a movie star. He checks in and out of hotel rooms, hangs out by the pool, and attends award shows and press conferences and does interviews on a press junket, where he has to contend with dopey questions and undignified situations that might make for compelling viewing if, as was the case with Bill Murray's appearance on the Japanese TV show and his filming the commercial in Translation, we had any sense that he might have more on his mind and better uses for his time. When I first heard about Somewhere, I remember being happy that Stephen Dorff had a lead role in a prestige picture. When Dorff first appeared on the scene, I sort of loathed him, mostly because he seemed awfully comfortable starring in the rotten 1993 movie S.F.W., which wanted to be to twentysomethings in my day what Daydream Nation wants to be to kids today: a raised middle finger and a sneer presented as the Attitude of the Moment. And in Backbeat, I thought he came across as a guy who thought he deserved to be a movie star, which was maybe not the best quality to highlight when you're supposed to be playing someone who walked away from the Beatles. But he won me over with his generous, flashy performances as the bad guys in City of Industry and Blade; he had a real man-you-love-to-hate quality.
WILD GRASS: Alain Resnais was 86 when his latest film won him a special jury prize for Lifetime Achievement at the 2009 Cannes Film Festival, and a number of people have remarked on how youthful-spirited the film itself is. It is that, and the bouncy mood and brightly hued cinematography by Éric Gautier can make you feel buoyant for a while at the start, before the heavyweight whimsicality of the thing start to feel slightly obnoxious. Sabine Azéma, outfitted with a head of red hair like a topiary sculpture, loses her wallet during a shoe-shopping excursion; André Dussollier, like Azema a Resnais regular of long standing, finds it, turns it in to the police, and then, having become fixated on the idea that his having found the wallet should somehow lead to a romantic encounter between the two of them, he basically stalks her. This is presented as if it were cute as all get out, and after she first reacts with confusion and anxiety, she decides that she should probably find it cute, too. The tone is all that much harder to read because of something that probably does reflect Resnais's age and that may not be intentional, and that was also a problem in his last film, Private Fears in Public Places, an artsy French adaptation of a machine-tooled British farce by Alan Ayckbourn, which was full of actors who seemed a little old for their parts. Dussollier, whose character is supposed to be in his fifties, is in his mid-sixties and looks older and not a little enfeebled. Azéma was 59 when the movie was made, and Anne Consigny, who's supposed to be Dussollier's wife of thirty years, was 46, which makes me feel less stupid about the fact that, for much of the movie, I thought she was playing his daughter. The fact that Dussollier looks (and moves) as if the most he'd really want from either woman would be that they might tuck him in with a glass of warm milk helps take the curse off the stalking scenes, including one in which he slashes Azéma's tires, because he never seems like much of a threat, sexual or otherwise. But he also doesn't seem so much romantic as dotty. I kept waiting for the scene that isn't here but feels as if it ought to be: the one where Consigny says, "Now daddy, you know perfectly well I'm not your wife. You've mixed your medications again. Now get out your hedge trimmers and do something to help this poor lady with her hair."
THE GREEN HORNET: After all the bad advance publicity, I wasn't expecting a good movie from Michel Gondry's superhero flick, but I was expecting a better time than I got from this thing. Outside of your hardcore pulp nostalgia niche, does anyone care about the Green Hornet? His contemporary, the Shadow, inspired a crappy movie in the '90s, but has otherwise had his legacy burnished by some excellent comic books (by Mike Kaluta and Denny O'Neil, by Howard Chaykin, and by Andy Helfer, Bill Sienkiewicz, and Kyle Baker), and will always be associated with the voice of Orson Welles. The Green Hornet's fame was only extended beyond the era of radio drama because the single-season '60s TV show co-starred Bruce Lee, who went on to greater things after the show was canceled, but who was always willing to share with interviewers what a demeaning experience it had been to drive the car for a leading man who possessed about a tenth of his charisma. (Particularly galling was the cross-over episode where the stars of The Green Hornet had to face off against the stars of Batman, which meant that Lee had to pretend to not have the stuff to wipe up the floor with Burt Ward.) The one promising thing about a Green Hornet movie was that, working on a property that didn't have a million Marvel zombies waiting for it with their knives out Gondry would be able to relax and do whatever he wanted with the property. But he seems to have viewed this project as his big chance to be a good company man and turn out something that, in today's corporate pop culture landscape, passes for normal. Those whose reaction to The Science of Sleep and Eternal Sunshine of the Spotless Mind was to hope that he might be able to turn down the overflowing spigot of his imagination may be unprepared for just how uninteresting he can be when he puts his mind to it. Except for a random surreal touch or two buried in a flashback sequence here and there and a mock action scene with the heroes driving through the wreckage of a newspaper office in the front half of a car that's been cut in half, the movie never feels as if Gondry had any fun making it, and the feeling is contagious.
KJ Dell'Antonia, one of the writers at Slate's blog devoted ti women's viewpoints, argues that Anthony Weiner needs to go, not because of the moral implications of his online flashing, but because his activities prove that he "isn't bright enough to... be in Congress." I've been wondering when I was first going to hear this argument, while recognizing that, if I still lived in New York, I'd have probably heard it a couple hundred times at work and on the subway by now. I feel that I remember the first time I heard it said, and not in jest, about Bill Clinton, fairly early in Impeachment Year 1998. I think that that time, it came from Russell Baker, a man I've regarded as a reliable fount of common sense since I was about nine. (I know that makes me sound like a godawful little wonk, but I make no apologies for having read the op-ed page of the McComb, Mississippi Enterprise-Journal as a child. There wasn't a hell of a lot else to do back then, in that place, once the sun went down and the werewolves were out. And believe me, you didn't have to tap into a vein of common sense too fucking often to stand out in the op-ed page of the McComb, Mississippi Enterprise-Journal.)
Me, I'm not a fan. I agree with Thomson that Malick has never made a movie that duplicated the best qualities of his first film, and that what I've seen of his later films combine an aimless yet inflated narrative approach--especially annoying in the case of The Thin Red Line, where the drooling spaciness was a betrayal of a good book, by James Jones--with a pointlessly "beautiful" visual approach that impresses some moviegoers as painterly but would be dismissed as kitsch Americana if the frames were hung in a gallery show. I also think that Malick is something of a New Age airhead with a frustrating habit, one not entirely keeping with his image as a man not of the Hollywood marketplace, to cast as his make leads whichever dubiously talented, handsome actor currently has the best publicist and most undeserved reputation as the new Brando. (The one exception to this rule is The Thin Red Line, in which he basically cast every actor in Los Angeles who wanted to spend a few weeks working with a living legend, then filmed every thought that passed through his head and took a meat axe to the results, so that the closing credits are overflowing with "Thank You" mentions of actors--Billy Bob Thornton, Martin Sheen, Gary Oldman, Bill Pullman, Donal Logue, Lukas Haas, Viggo Mortensen, Jason Patric, Randall Duk Kim, and Mickey Rourke among them--who traveled to the set to do work that was not fated to see the light of day. In my favorite moment--besides the Nick Nolte/Elias Koteas sequence, which is the best thing Malick's done since Badlands--George Clooney appears just long enough to make a speech to a group of soldiers, which you can't hear, because Malick decided that it was the best place to have another actor read a voice-over monologue.) But that's just me.
One word I wouldn't hesitate to apply to the Eastwood movies that Schickel loves so much is "boring." Most of the movies on which Eastwood was a prime mover and shaker--whether we're talking about the genre action fodder that kept his star aloft after he stopped working with Sergio Leone or the more "artistic" projects he's taken on in his dotage--bore me because they're predictable, shallow, and served up with a minimum of style and invention. Schickel doesn't really disagree, he'd just use different words to say the same thing. In a review of the 1976 The Outlaw Josey Wales, he wrote that "One man's classicism, however, is another man's cliché", making it clear that as far as he was concerned, the good-guy-shoots-bad-guys Western mechanics of Josey Wales amounted to sheer classicism, adding, "Eastwood as a director manages his action sequences in a no-nonsense manner" and " reminds us of a traditional American style of screen heroism—a moral man slow to rile but wonderfully skilled when he must finally enforce his conception of right and wrong. In these moments, he links us pleasingly, satisfyingly with our movie pasts, rekindles briefly a dying glow." Basically, Schickel wants to see the same old movie over and over, with a cowboy hat on it.
If Schickel and Kois are dispiriting because Schickel is an old fart repelled by the shock of the new and Kois is a jaded young thing who wants credit for keeping up with the culture but bores easily when he's not being regularly zapped in his adrenaline zone, then Dargis and Scott are tremendously depressing because they seem to accept the terms set up by their opponents. Unlike Macdonald, they don't allow that there may be different kinds of entertainment than Bob's Burgers and Red Dead Redemption; they don't argue, as I would, that certain "slow, meditative" movies are, for those of us who get on their wavelength, pleasure and fun, even if it's not the kind of fun that makes you stand on your chair and twirl your T-shirt over your heads while you whoop at the screen. Instead, they seem to accept Kois's concept of "cultural vegetables" and then bang their fists on the table, ordering you to force some down before you can have your ice cream. The work of Tarkovsky and Bela Tarr, Dargis writes, "take time away even as they restore a sense of duration, of time and life passing... In wandering there can be revelation as you meditate, trance out, bliss out, luxuriate in your thoughts, think." Funny, I thought that's what nature was for. If I went to the trouble of making a movie, especially one that ran more than an hour and twenty minutes, I'd flirt with the idea that I'd fallen down on the job if the comment cards came back comparing it to the last time the viewer spent the afternoon staring at a rippling stream, but maybe that's just what some of today's film school grads are shooting for. Scott asks, "Why is it, though, that 'serious' is a bad word in cultural conversations, or at least in discussions of film? Why is thinking about a movie an activity to be avoided, and a movie that seems to require thinking a source of suspicion? ... I certainly don’t think fun should be banished from the screen, or that popular entertainment is essentially antithetical to art." That's a relief. Just don't get caught saying that you think that The Makioka Sisters or The Home and the World and La Belle Noiseuse are "fun." (These are examples of movies that I regard as long and slow and meditative and that I derive pleasure from watching, though for all I know, Dargis and Scott think they're only a half a step removed from The Matrix Reloaded.) And be sure and mention, as both Dargis and Scott do, that you really, honestly do like "fun" movies. Scott is so hard up for fun that he liked Hot Tub Time Machine. And if I've read some of her broad hints correctly, Dargis counts herself as a fan of Richard Donner. (She also shares Schickel's high opinion of Clint Eastwood. Her rave review of Gran Torino seemed to go out of its way to call for a reappraisal of Stanley Kramer, who I thought we all agreed was the most happily forgotten big name director of the '50s and '60s.)